Saturday, January 21, 2017

AFP spokesman: No thwarting of facts on soldiers’ pay hike

From GMA News (Jan 21): AFP spokesman: No thwarting of facts on soldiers’ pay hike

A top official of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) clarified on Saturday that the military also recognizes the executive order signed during the last months of the Aquino administration for the wage increase reflected in their pay slips this month.

Col. Edgard Arevalo, the chief of AFP's Public Affairs Office, argued in a statement that "there is no thwarting of facts by the AFP" when he issued a press release last week, wherein he expressed gratitude to President Rodrigo Duterte for the military personnel's wage increase.

Arevalo's clarification came after Senator Antonio Trillanes IV reminded the AFP and the Philippine National Police that their pay hike is the second tranche of former President Benigno Aquino III's Executive Order 201.

"Sen. Trillanes sought to set the records straight that the second tranche increase in soldiers' take home pay was attributable to Pres. Aquino and not Pres. Duterte," the AFP official said.

"Hence the gratitude of the AFP should be to the former and not to the latter," he added.

Arevalo noted that in his press release on January 14, he recognized Aquino's EO 201, which covers salary increases for government workers. "...an increased take home pay starting January 2017... is a result of the second tranche implementation of Executive Order 201. The four-tranche salary adjustment scheme was adopted, budgeted, and continued by the Duterte administration," he said, quoting his earlier statement.

"Having said that, the AFP therefore recognizes that EO 201 was issued by the former President Aquino," he noted. "And for that the AFP is thankful. We have expressed that as soon as the increase took effect in year 2016," he added.

Arevalo, however, admitted that in his earlier statement the AFP just expressed its gratitude to Duterte for adopting, budgeting, and continuing with the scheme that brought the increase.

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/596601/news/nation/afp-spokesman-no-thwarting-of-facts-on-soldiers-pay-hike

Gov't chief peace negotiator defends Pres. Duterte

From the Philippine News Agency (Jan 22): Gov't chief peace negotiator defends Pres. Duterte

Government chief negotiator Silvestre Bello III said President Rodrigo Duterte is determined to uphold human rights of political dissenters even as he continues to seek a negotiated political settlement with rebel forces.

This was the response of Bello, who is also labor secretary, to the list of alleged violations of the provisions of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) human rights group Karapatan submitted prior to the opening of the third round of peace talks in Rome, Italy.

As far as the GRP chief negotiator is concerned, there have been no acts committed by the president that would constitute violation of CARHRIHL, which supplemental guidelines were signed yesterday, January 21.

“The track record of President Duterte will speak for itself. He has always upheld the rights of political dissenters and respected their human rights,” Bello said in defending the president.

“Some may find his unconventional approach in addressing peace and order issues in the country but he has always maintained high respect for political dissent,” Bello added.

Nevertheless, Bello assured that the government will look into, and if warranted, investigate the cases submitted by the National Democratic Front and allied rights organizations.

He said the signing of the supplemental agreement put into motion the operationalization of the joint monitoring committee (JMC).

Bello however said the government also submitted pacts committed by rebel forces that violated some provisions of CARHRIHL, among them the torching of buses and heavy equipment by New People’s Army (NPA) rebels.

All these allegations of violations from both sides would be addressed by the JMC which will be immediately constituted by both parties, the GRP panel said.

These also underscore the need to forge a bilateral ceasefire agreement to determine and provide mechanism to monitor and address violations.

“Hopefully, the JMC will expedite the forging of a bilateral ceasefire agreement that will address the alleged issues of government violations and provocative and prohibited acts of NPA rebels,” Bello explained.

The signing of the supplemental guidelines is the first agreement signed by both parties under the Duterte government.

All previous documents signed in the August and October rounds of talks were joint statements and declarations.

“In just five months, we have already scored a victory for the Filipino people,” Bello declared.
The CARHRIHL primarily encourages all victims of violations and abuses of human rights or their surviving families due to the armed conflict to come forward with their complaints and evidence.

He is confident that at the pace the peace negotiations are going, they may be able to sign a final peace agreement within the year to allow the Duterte government time to implement a comprehensive peace agreement.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=&sid=&nid=&rid=957239

What Does China's 'New Asian Security Concept' Mean for the US?

From The Diplomat (Jan 21): What Does China's 'New Asian Security Concept' Mean for the US? (By Major David C. McCaughrin)

A closer look at China’s vision for remaking Asian security, and what the United States can do about it.

What Does China's 'New Asian Security Concept' Mean for the US?

Image Credit: DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley
 
In October, China hosted the seventh Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, during which Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin outlined a framework for a regional security architecture to meet the emerging challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Liu’s comments did not represent fresh thinking; he rather expanded upon an existing Chinese concept. Chinese strategists, pundits, academia, and government officials had discussed such an architecture among themselves for years until President Xi Jinping publicized what he called the “New Asian Security Concept” during the fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May 2014. A year later, the concept was raised again in the 2015 Defense White Paper. Most recently, China outlined its views in a white paper on “Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation.”
 
China’s concept was subjected to a considerable amount of analysis and commentary post-Xiangshan, notably by Dr. Alice Ekman and Prashanth Parameswaran. Ekman contends that Beijing has an unfolding plan for a new regional security architecture not based on any formal alliance system, but rather on weaving together a tighter web of existing organizations and entities and bending them toward Beijing’s desired strategic ends. Parameswaran argues that Beijing’s proposal has merits that deserve serious consideration and thus should not be rejected by the United States and others out-of-hand; however, Beijing needs to adjust its message to assuage the concerns of both Washington and regional neighbors who see benefit in a continued active role of the United States in Asian security. These countries clearly hope not to be forced to choose between U.S. security assistance and China-funded economic development.
 
U.S. and China: Dueling Visions
 
Washington outlined its own vision for Asian security in June at Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue, widely considered the preeminent multilateral dialogue on Asian security issues. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter presented the “Principled Security Network of Alliances and Partnerships,” in which a regional security network is derived according to norms and principles rooted in common interpretations of international law.
 
Liu countered at Xiangshan by introducing five organizing principles that outlined China’s vision for a new security framework: (1) common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; (2) regional and international norms; (3) partnerships rather than alliances; (4) comprehensive and multilayered network of bodies focused on enhancing extant institutions vice creating new ones; (5) promotion of common development and prosperity. These same points are reflected in the white paper issued earlier this month.
 
Superficially, these two visions appear very similar; however, China’s aversion to formal alliances and desire to tie security more directly to economic interests differentiate Beijing’s proposal. Additionally, while Washington left open the possibility for Beijing to join the Principled Network and vice versa, for either country to participate in the other’s security architecture would signify acquiescence to their rival’s strategic vision, which may be too high an opportunity cost to be a realistic option for either government.
 
Xiangshan, established as a more Sino-friendly alternative to Shangri-La, served as the ideal forum for China to unveil a more comprehensive description of its vision to an international audience. Beijing perceives a strategic opportunity to attain regional leadership and greater global influence, given that Chinese policy makers project the United States will enter a period of “strategic contraction” under the new administration. New U.S. President Donald Trump has already announced its pending withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Beijing may assume the new administration will focus more heavily on domestic affairs.
 
Analysis of the “New Asian Security Concept”
 
The trumpeting of China’s blueprint for Asian security marks the latest step in Xi’s efforts to promote and drive a stronger regional role for China commensurate with its perceived status as a great power. The “New Asian Security Concept” envisions progressively displacing the U.S.-led security order by offering economic and security incentives in exchange for deference to China’s strategic prerogatives in the region. Beijing ultimately wants a Chinese sphere of influence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, in which even U.S. security engagement happens only with Beijing’s blessing. Additionally, it may also tie together further countries vital to China’s continued economic success and supply lines.
 
To Beijing, China’s status as the preeminent regional power is the default state of affairs, and was lost during the “century of humiliation.” According to China’s logic, Beijing’s leadership of a responsible, inclusive regional security architecture not only builds regional deference to China’s security preferences but also frees up Washington to direct its attention to problems external to East Asia. This will, in theory, decrease bilateral tensions and promote both mutual trust and stronger relations between the two major powers.
 
It’s important to remember that Beijing’s economic and security goals are inextricably linked. China hopes to translate its growing economic clout into greater leverage over regional security affairs, as well as increased global influence. China’s ongoing efforts through the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) signify Beijing’s steady acquisition of influence through economic development; in the mind of China’s leadership, the economic initiatives are not just ends in themselves but rather pave the way to a security architecture more palatable to potential member states. Security influence commensurate with Beijing’s already considerable economic influence signals a key milestone toward achievement of true great power status. China is becoming increasingly confident that it can lead the region, preferably with Washington’s tacit consent, but without it if necessary.
 
Potential U.S. Response
 
Xi’s first telephone conversation with Trump was noticeably missing standard Chinese catchphrases used to describe Beijing’s vision for the bilateral relationship, such as “New Type Major Country Relations,” a construct presented by Xi that sought to emphasize cooperation and avoid conflict. This avoidance presents a strategic opportunity to Washington to reset the conversation. The subsequent congratulatory call to Trump from President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan followed by the president-elect’s comments on the “one China” policy provoked a storm of aggressive rhetoric and actions by Beijing intended to shape the incoming administration. Nevertheless, it may also have offered the United States an opportunity to reshape the relationship on more favorable terms to the Washington. The new Trump administration needs to be the first to offer new language, or new interpretations of existing language, and understand the underlying limitations that arise from accepting China’s terms. In this iterative bargaining, the first to lay out a strategic vision for the bilateral relationship controls the narrative and consequently the strategic initiative.
 
Despite Beijing’s “win-win” characterization, China’s offers to “reset” bilateral relations are largely designed to facilitate Beijing’s great power ambitions. China’s comprehensive approach to the bilateral relationship must thus be taken into account. If the U.S. addresses the bilateral relationship in a disjointed fashion in which security and economic concerns are addressed separately, Washington will only be able to react to Beijing’s actions.
 
China’s authoritative media describe a pending U.S. strategic contraction from the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and the positive steps Beijing will take to fill it. This contraction is broadly assumed to be inevitable; this presents a strategic narrative that China is using to influence decisions in capitals around the region. Hence, the new U.S. administrations should work to align their highest-order talking points on the Indo-Asia-Pacific as soon as possible and close the vacuum Beijing is already trying to fill.
Beijing’s implementation of a new security architecture poses one of the most holistic strategic challenges currently faced by the United States. China does not seek to create this architecture from scratch; Beijing will weave together existing arrangements, enabling them to move quickly and avoid lengthy negotiations on the establishment of new structures. The potential implications are significant. Smaller regional countries may find themselves forced to choose: partner with China as a “string” tied to economic development initiatives, or partner with the United States, long a security partner of choice for many regional countries.
 
In recent years, Beijing increasingly seeks a leadership role in line with its considerable economic clout. Achievement of an equivalent level of security influence will confer to Beijing not just great power status, but also the ability to dictate its security preferences in the region, and beyond. Washington must clearly understand the implications of China’s vision in order to maintain its preeminent position in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The presidential transition offers a small window of opportunity to respond accordingly and shift the terms of discussion to favor the United States.
 
Major David C. McCaughrin is a career army officer with extensive experience in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
 

International Law Is Under Siege in the South China Sea

From The Diplomat (Jan 21): International Law Is Under Siege in the South China Sea (By Douglas Gates)

China is the latest to flout international law, but the United States paved the way.

International Law Is Under Siege in the South China Sea

Image Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Declan Barnes/Released

China’s seizure of a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in the South China Sea last month garnered widespread attention. The drone was an oceanographic research instrument, available for commercial purchase off the shelf and without any value for capture. Although Washington and Beijing seemed to resolve the issue within a few days, other commentators have noted that the incident fits into a pattern of Chinese behavior surrounding American transitions of power. Both the 2001 EP-3 collision and the 2009 harassment of USNS Impeccable occurred in the weeks immediately following American presidential inaugurations. Both actions seemed calculated to challenge the new presidents in an effort to gauge their reactions and convey a message of Chinese strength and determination early in the new leaders’ terms. This time, Beijing did not wait until the new president took office; the UUV seizure occurred more than a month before Donald Trump’s inauguration.

However, the incident also fits into another pattern: a creeping disregard among major military powers for international law. The tendency is not unique to China; Russia and the United States play an important part. While the United States first laid the legal framework, China and Russia have picked up the mantle in the last few years and taken the lead. Trump’s election may reinforce the three countries’ directions, signaling difficult years ahead for international legal forums.

The United States was the first to reject the jurisdiction of international legal tribunals in recent decades. In 1986, the U.S. refused to participate in legal proceedings over its support for the Contra rebellion against the ruling Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Although the International Court of Justice held in Nicaragua v. United States that the U.S. had violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty under customary international law, an American veto in the UN Security Council prevented Nicaragua from enforcing the judgment in any meaningful way. The case helped to shape American political skepticism toward international courts; the United States takes no part in the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court. It even refused to ratify the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the comprehensive maritime law agreement that it spearheaded through the negotiation process. The trend, however, seemed to be a quirk of American exceptionalism. Over the next 30 years, the use of international tribunals continued to grow among other countries, particularly in the maritime arena.

UNCLOS included a binding dispute resolution system to encourage members to solve their issues without using intimidation or force against their neighbors. The system, which entered into force in the mid-1990s and offers a range of forums where parties may bring grievances against one another, has been moderately successful during its short history. Its tribunals have developed legal standards for flag states to retrieve impounded fishing and commercial vessels and has resolved a number of maritime border disputes. Today, eight cases remain pending in three separate forums, signaling that the process is attractive to a number of countries and provides a useful way to solve problems peacefully. However, recent events have exposed a major flaw in the system: great powers have discovered that they can ignore it with impunity.

Russia revived the American approach to international courts in 2013, when an obscure dispute arose over the arrest of a Greenpeace ship protesting a Russian oil platform in the Barents Sea. The ship, M/V Arctic Sunrise, was flagged in the Netherlands. Following the arrest, the government of the Netherlands filed a fairly routine request for Russia to release the vessel and crew in exchange for a security bond under Article 292 of UNCLOS. When Russia refused, the Netherlands resorted to the dispute resolution mechanisms under the Convention. It filed a series of petitions with both the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), alleging that the Russians had violated the Convention and demanding both the ship’s return and money damages. The Russians disputed the tribunals’ jurisdiction, arguing that the matter was not covered under the Convention. Both courts disagreed, ruling that UNCLOS did apply and requesting that Russia appear in court. Instead, the Russians balked; they simply refused to show up. When the tribunals ruled against them in absentia, Russia refused to acknowledge the violation or pay damages. Although Moscow granted the crew immunity and eventually released the ship as a domestic matter, it never acknowledged the binding nature of the courts’ ruling.

The following year, Beijing followed the Russian example. After years of complaints by Southeast Asian countries and the United States over China’s excessive territorial claims and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided to invoke the law. Manila brought an arbitration case against China at the PCA under the Convention, alleging that China’s “nine-dash line” claim and environmentally destructive construction of artificial islands, among other activities, violated the agreement. When the Court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case under UNCLOS, China issued a series of aggressive press releases condemning the legal process and refusing to participate in any way. Although the Court later ruled strongly in favor of the Philippines, striking down China’s claim to sovereignty over the entire Sea and condemning its actions, China made no change to its behavior. By courting the loyalty of new Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte and pulling him out of the American orbit, Beijing prevented any subsequent efforts to enforce the judgment against it. It is as if the arbitration had never occurred.

In three years, China and Russia have managed to undermine the Convention’s primary method for resolving disputes that took two decades to build. Their actions have exposed the fundamental weakness of the process: if a state declines to appear in court, the tribunals have no power to make it change its behavior. When that state is a major military power like China or Russia, the legal judgments become irrelevant.

This pattern puts last month’s events into context. The Chinese seizure of the U.S. Navy drone, outside the area encompassed by its “nine-dash line” claim and within a few hundred yards of the American vessel controlling the drone, was clearly illegal under any understanding of maritime law. However, because the United States has refused to ratify the Convention and China has rejected its jurisdiction to resolve disputes, there is no available forum for a peaceful resolution. Taken together with Russia’s recent decision to pull out of the International Criminal Court agreement and the Trump administration’s skepticism toward international agreements and alliances, the next few years are likely to see an increase in the sort of saber-rattling and geopolitical instability that treaties and conventions aim to minimize. When three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council pay no regard to the organization’s dispute resolution forums, less powerful countries will have little incentive to submit to the courts’ jurisdiction.

The situation is particularly dire for mid-sized countries like Japan and Vietnam, which are experiencing tensions with their larger and more powerful neighbor but which are unlikely to be pulled into China’s orbit willingly for historical and cultural reasons. Without the ability to appeal to law, they will be especially dependent on the United States for protection. With Trump in office, that help may not materialize. The absence of the rule of law at sea will provide incentives for nations to build up their armed forces and will increase the risk of a naval conflict. Asia’s Cauldron, as Robert Kaplan once termed the South China Sea, may soon begin to boil over.

[Douglas Gates is a former U.S. Naval Officer. His assignments included service as personal aide to the Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in East Asia and master instructor of political science at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. He is currently a J.D. Candidate at the University of Chicago Law School].

http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/international-law-is-under-siege-in-the-south-china-sea/

The 'Civilization' of China’s Military Presence in the South China Sea

From The Diplomat (Jan 21): The 'Civilization' of China’s Military Presence in the South China Sea (By Zhibo Qiu)

Chinese policy in the South China Sea increasingly focuses on boosting its civilian presence on disputed islands.

The 'Civilization' of China’s Military Presence in the South China Sea

Crew members holding a Chinese national flag pose for pictures in front of a plane of the China Southern Airlines as the plane landed at a new airport China built on Mischief Reef of the Spratlys, South China Sea (July 13, 2016). Image Credit: REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
 
From increasing land reclamation activities to expanding military infrastructure and capacities, many international observers have expressed concerns over China’s “militarization” of the South China Sea. However, some have neglected the tendencies which actually witnessed a shift toward to opposite policy direction — the “civilization” of China’s military presence on the disputed islands. This trend will have profound implications for China’s foreign policy in the region, and deserves more attention from policymakers and scholars.
 
The increasing civilian elements of China’s South China Sea military presence are part of China’s grand strategy to integrate military and civilian capacities nationwide. On January 8, a new industrial alliance on strengthening military-civilian integration was established in Beijing, supported by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. This alliance will create a cooperative platform to build up China’s military industrial capacity, drawing on resources from both state-owned defense companies and private companies.
 
Earlier this year, the Party issued a special circular on integrating military capacity building and economic development. The circular called for using market forces to optimize military resources nationwide, and actively guide private investment and technology to serve defense purposes, which in return will provide long-term economic development. Resources will be pooled and shared between military operations and civilian activities.
 
In particular, the circular mentioned the implications for China’s maritime policy. According to the document, China will integrate its national interests in the territorial integrity of its oceans and economic exploitation of marine resources, and gradually form a joint force pooling the resources of the Party, state, military, police, and citizens to safeguard its maritime borders.
 
These plans are not only on paper; Beijing is already taking real-world steps toward these ends. A closer examination of China’s current activities in the South China Sea shed light on China’s integrated military-civilian strategy and its implications for the maritime disputes.
 
To legitimize the legal status of these islands domestically, China took an important step in July 2012, when it announced Sansha as a provincial-level city in Hainan Province. According to China, Sansha City has jurisdiction over the Paracels, Spratlys, and other disputed features. By legalizing the administrative status of these islands in its political system, China has set up a solid legal basis at home to claim territorial sovereignty against competing claims from Vietnam and the Philippines. Notably, the city government of Sansha is located on Yongxing (Woody) Island in the Paracels, which is also a center for China’s growing military capacity in the region.
 
The international legal status of Sansha City may face more challenges after an international tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled against China’s sweeping maritime claims. However, the set-up of a provincial-level city in Sansha has different implications domestically and is a substantial step toward making China’s military actions more “civilianized.” Intriguingly, the disputed islands, under Sansha’s leadership, are increasingly branded as a popular destination to attract patriotic tourists and private investors.
 
China plans to transform some of the islands into vacation destinations for domestic tourists. The local government has already launched public campaigns in the media, urging Chinese tourists to join the patriotic-themed cruise tours to these islands. On December 21, 2016, A new ship called Dream of the South Sea embarked on its first four-day cruise from Sanya City, on Hainan, to three islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Operated by the largest stated-owned travel agency, China International Travel Service, the themed cruise will include both patriotic and recreational activities. Aside from sightseeing, tourists will sign a long paper scroll to show their support for China’s territory sovereignty and sing China’s national anthem on the disputed islands.
 
The Dream of the South Sea, which can accommodate up to 893 people, will be scheduled to offer this cruise between four and six times per month. It is the second such ship operating in the South China Sea; a 300-person ship running the same route has already hosted 23,000 tourists since April 2013. From now on, the two ships will bring even more Chinese tourists to these islands.
 
This is only the start of China’s ambitious plan to increase its civilian presence in the South China Sea. In an interview with Xinhua News Agency, Xiao Jie, mayor of Sansha City, further confirmed that the city plans to focus on promoting tourism and developing tourist infrastructure. Sansha plans to offer a wide range of tourist services, including weddings, surfing, fishing and scuba diving trips, and wants to brand itself as an alternative tourist destination to Maldives. The local government’s blueprint also mapped out a plan to develop two to three marine national parks — likely to be in disputed areas as well — for sightseeing purposes.
 
Furthermore, the city government has formulated an “Action Plan on Promoting Sansha Tourism” with substantial funding from Hainan Province. Currently, Chinese tourists can only visit the South China Sea islands via cruises the depart from Sanya, a tourist city on Hainan Island. To attract more tourists, Sansha plans to open the airport on Yongxing (Woody) Island to civilian flights. Built in 1990, the Yongxing airport has long been an exclusively military airport, for the use of Chinese warplanes. Mayor Xiao Jie promised that soon Chinese tourists will be able visit Sansha via direct commercial flights from their home cities.
 
Opening the military airport to civilian flights is a perfect example of what the Party circular called pooling and sharing resources as part of military-civilian integration. China has also made a point of sending passenger jets to land on its newly-built airstrips on the Spratlys, opening up the potential for commercial flights to these islands as well.
 
Aside from tourism, Sansha is also trying to attract more permanent civilian residents. Sasha’s first local regulation, passed by the local legislature in January 2016, was the Administrative Measures on Sansha Residential Services. The local government has pledged to improve infrastructure for island residents, ranging from the water supply, electricity, and sewage to a full-coverage WiFi network.
As part of those efforts, China’s next step to “civilianize” these islands is to attract private investment. Feng Wenhai, Sansha’s deputy mayor, made it clear that Sansha welcomes private investors to support civilian infrastructure construction. Already, the local government plans to initiate a series of public-private-partnerships programs. Plus, Sansha has been branded as an important hub of China’s Maritime Silk Road, raising its profile for investors.
 
From the beginning, Sansha City has received preferential policies on taxation, which are attractive to private investors. According to the deputy mayor, so far 119 companies have registered in Sansha. Together with 110 individual businesses, they contributed approximately $106.6 million in local taxes in 2015.
 
If the local government in Sansha is as strategic as it is ambitious, it is likely that these tourism, infrastructure, and financial projects will gradually open to international private investors as well, further legitimizing China’s presence in the South China Sea.
 
In a few years, China will have a robust tourist industry, a well-populated residential community, and local businesses with mixed public-private ownership in the South China Sea. That will make it difficult for the international community to claim that China’s activities on the disputed islands are pure “militarization” anymore. Undoubtedly, the number of China’s South China Sea island residents and tourists will continue grow at an alarming rate, which will eventually change the nature of China’s military operations in these islands.
 
To some degree, these Chinese tourists and residents serve as a “civilian shield” in the South China Sea. The potential for large causalities among Chinese civilians will make foreign countries think twice before initiating military action. For all the stakeholders involved in the South China Sea disputes, the “civilianization” of China’s presence in the South China Sea is a significant factor to take into consideration when formulating future military strategy and foreign policy. The trend has already become a reality that international policy makers and experts can no longer afford to neglect.
 
[Zhibo Qiu is an independent researcher and political consultant. Her research focuses on Chinas domestic politics, foreign policy, and overseas investment. She holds masters degrees from the University of Cambridge and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. The article represents the author’s personal opinions.]
 

Phl, China eye code of conduct framework this year

From the Philippine Star (Jan 22): Phl, China eye code of conduct framework this year



The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on Friday said both parties spoke at the 20th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations held on Thursday. File photo

Philippine and Chinese foreign ministry officials are eyeing a framework on the code of conduct for claimants in the South China Sea by mid-2017.

The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on Friday said both parties spoke at the 20th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations held on Thursday.

The two sides, during the meeting, reaffirmed their commitment to uphold peace and stability in the disputed region.

“Both sides spoke on the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) and the mutual interest to reach a COC framework by the middle of 2017,” the DFA said in a statement.
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“The Philippines also conveyed its concerns on recent incidents in the South China Sea,” the DFA added, referring to the reported presence of Chinese weapons systems on artificial islands created by the Chinese inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/01/22/1665006/phl-china-eye-code-conduct-framework-year

Philippine Army says LGBT community can join, but they have to ‘behave properly’

From Attitude (Jan 22): Philippine Army says LGBT community can join, but they have to ‘behave properly’

LGBT members can join the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but there's one condition



The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is now welcoming LGBT community to sign up and join the army, on one condition.

According to NewNowNext, the AFP, who is trying to recruit new soldiers, promises they won’t discriminate against LGBT soldiers, as long as “they behave.”

Chief of Public Affairs, Colonel Edgard Arevalo, said: “We are being asked whether the recruitment will include members of the LGBT community. Are we not going to discriminate them? The answer is no. The AFP is not going to discriminate against them. Please feel free to apply and enter the Armed Forces.”

The officer than added, “But we have one recommendation.”

“The moment that they apply and get accepted in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, we are reminding them that they need to act and behave with dignity and with proper care to the uniform.”

He then stated that the LGBT community would be a great asset to the AFP.

The decision to welcome LGBT community members comes after Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte caused a stir after he called the US Ambassador to the Philippines “gay.”

http://attitude.co.uk/philippine-army-says-lgbt-community-can-join-but-they-have-to-behave-properly/

Lines now clearly drawn on joint truce agreement

From the Manila Bulletin (Jan 22): Lines now clearly drawn on joint truce agreement

The bursts of applause in Saturday’s signing of another milestone agreement between the Philippine Government (GRP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) more or less showed the sentiment of both sides regarding the forging of a joint ceasefire agreement in the third round of peace talks in Rome, Italy.

​Negotiating panels from the GRP and NDF sign the supplemental agreement on Joint Monitoring Committee on the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law as negotiations move towards other substantive agenda. (Photo credits: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process | Manila Bulletin)

Negotiating panels from the GRP and NDF sign the supplemental agreement on Joint Monitoring Committee on the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law as negotiations move towards other substantive agenda. (Photo credits: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process | Manila Bulletin)

After the supplemental guidelines that fully operationalized the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) under the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Law (CARHRIHL) was signed by both parties at the Holiday Inn Rome – Eur Parco de Medici, the lines were clearly drawn when NDF peace panel chairman Fidel Agcaoili was asked by a Filipino journalist during the ensuing press conference if the two parties were already nearing the signing of a bilateral ceasefire agreement.

The right side of the function hall, occupied by the GRP delegation, broke into cheers as Agcaoili was put to task to make a definite statement on the ceasefire, a development that President Rodrigo R. Duterte is awaiting word of back in Manila.

“I’d like to state clearly that the implementation of CARHRIHL requires the release of the 392 political prisoners,” Agcaoili jabbed back that sent the left side of the room, where the NDF delegation sat, clapping in approval.

Agcaoili explained that the 392 prisoners they were asking to be released were “charged with common crimes,” and that “some of them have already been asked to withdraw their appeals.”
“So they should be released immediately,” he maintained.

Even before the Rome talks started, Duterte had made it clear that he would only start ordering the release of political prisoners once he sees a signed document by the GRP and NDP peace panels agreeing to a joint, bilateral ceasefire.

As it is, the two parties have unilateral ceasefires in place ever since the first round of the peace negotiations in Oslo, Norway last August 2016.

Initial peace dividend of the 3rd round of GRP-NDF peace talks in Rome—signed supplemental guidelines to monitor violations of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). (Photo credits: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process | Manila Bulletin)

Initial peace dividend of the 3rd round of GRP-NDF peace talks in Rome—signed supplemental guidelines to monitor violations of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). (Photo credits: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process | Manila Bulletin)

And as he had said in the opening of this third round of talks Thursday, Agcaoili also raised the “question of militarization in the countryside.”

“There should be a discontinuation of Oplan Bayanihan, and of Oplan Kapayapaan in which the New People’s Army (NPA) is treated as a peace-inclined armed group,” Agcaoili pointed out.

And while he said that a bilateral ceasefire could be “worked out,” he was nevertheless critical of the Duterte administration when he added that “it requires action, not simply statements, or press releases.”

“Warm bodies of political prisoners outside prison; and the withdrawal of the military so that the people in the countryside won’t be terrorized,” Agcaoili summed up their demands.

But when pressed on by the media if a bilateral ceasefire agreement could no longer be forged before the third round of talks ends on January 25, Agcaoili was quick to retort: “I’m not saying that.”

This had GRP peace panel chairman Silvestre Bello III breaking into a huge smile and gesturing a thumbs-up sign as the government side of the room broke into a hearty applause.

“There are things that can be talked about. But it depends what we are going to talk about and what they can give,” Agcaoili said.

 Bello said he was encouraged that Agcaoili, himself, underscored that for a JMC on CARHRIHL to work, there should be a bilateral agreement on a ceasefire that should first be in place.

“There is a need now to come up with a joint, bilateral ceasefire agreement so we would know what these violations are and how these will be treated (by the JMC),” he said.

Under the supplemental guidelines signed Saturday, “complaints for alleged violations of the specific provisions of the CARHRIHL…may either be filed in person, through email, fax, post or courier to the nominated section in the JMC secretariat.”

The complaints could be filed in English, Filipino or any other major language.

The guidelines also said that “a complainant may be a victim of the alleged violation, a relative of the victim, a duly-authorized representative, or any person, organization or entity with direct, substantial or sufficient interest in the subject of the complaint.”

As such, complaints could be filed by “human rights groups, peace advocacy groups, church members, media, or anyone capable of filing the complaint on behalf of the victim or relative of the victim.”

The joint secretariat of the JMC is situated at the Immaculate Conception Cathedral in Cubao, Quezon City.

The supplemental guidelines complement the operational guidelines issued on February 14, 2004 in Oslo, Norway.

http://news.mb.com.ph/2017/01/22/lines-now-clearly-drawn-on-joint-truce-agreement/

Stay close to Malaysian waters, fishermen warned

From The Star Online (Jan 22): Stay close to Malaysian waters, fishermen warned

Fishermen in Sabah’s east coast have been warned against crossing the sea border to southern Philippines as they not only faced action by the authorities there but can also be kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf-linked gangs.

Amid the latest suspected kidnapping of three Indonesians from a Sandakan-registered fishing vessel in Tawi Tawi waters, Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Khalid Abu Bakar said local fishermen should stay within Malaysian waters.

“I know these operators know it too. We will talk to them again,” he told reporters after visiting the General Operations Force Sabah Brigade headquarters in Kinarut near here yesterday.

Khalid said various steps were taken by the force under the Eastern Sabah Security Command (Esscom) to deter armed kidnap groups roaming the sea borders from entering Malaysian territory.

“Some measures are being taken and some being planned,” Khalid said, adding that they did not need more reinforcement at this point.

On whether any calls were made to the owner of the fishing boat or to the families of the missing crew members who the Philippines authorities believe were kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf-linked groups, Khalid said there were none.

“We are waiting for updates from our counterparts (Philippines),” he said, adding that the fishing boat was found empty with its engines running in waters close to Taganak in the Tawi Tawi area.
The three Indonesians are Hamdan Salim, 29, Subandi Sattu, 47, and Sudaling Samandung, 26.

They are believed to have been kidnapped by an Abu Sayyaf member who goes by the name Halipa.

Meanwhile, Khalid said the five Tiger Platoon personnel who shot dead three members of a notorious cross-border kidnap gang led by Abraham@Ibrahim Hamid would be promoted by a rank for their daring act to keep the community safe.

They also captured two other members during the shootout in waters off Semporna on Dec 8.

http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/01/22/stay-close-to-malaysian-waters-fishermen-warned/

Navy sending more boats, best people to fight Abu Sayyaf

Navy sending more boats, best people to fight Abu Sayyaf Navy sending more boats, best people to fight Abu Sayyaf



Naval Forces Western Mindanao will be sent speedboats and the best personnel. File photo

The Philippine Navy will send the Naval Forces Western Mindanao more boats and the best people to help fight the Abu Sayyaf Group and stem a series of abductions of seafarers near the borders with Malaysia and Indonesia.
 
Navy Flag-Officer-in-Command R.Adm. Ronald Mercado said they the Navy is sending 30 speedboats to NFWM to help the Western Mindanao Command defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group, which is believed to be behind the kidnappings.
 
Mercado bared this on the sidelines of the change of command where R.Adm. Rene Medina took over as NFWM chief from R.Adm. Jorge Amba, who has been named commander of the Naval Education and Training Command in Zambales.
 
“We are prepared to provide the needed sea assets and the best people we have here in the region,” Mercado said in response to President Rodrigo Duterte's order to crush the Abu Sayyaf Group.
 
Mercado's order also came after Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Eduardo Año and top military officials assessed the security in Tawi-Tawi and Sulu, where the kidnappings have been taking place.
 
Medina said minutes after he assumed command that NFWM will intensify security at sea and thwart kidnapping and piracy attempts. 
 
Westmincom reported that the Abu Sayyaf has 26 hostages in Sulu: Seven Indonesians, five Malaysians, a Dutch national, a German and six Filipinos.

http://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/01/21/1664727/navy-sending-more-boats-best-people-fight-abu-sayyaf

US brings satellite imagery system Eagle Vision to Philippines

From Update.Ph (Jan 21): US brings satellite imagery system Eagle Vision to Philippines



A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft sits parked on the flightline at Clark Air Base, Philippines, Jan. 14, 2017. The aircraft transported a team of U.S. Airmen and Soldiers and a ground-based satellite imagery system known as Eagle Vision. US Air Force photo

The United States Pacific Air Forces (US PACAF) through the 13th Expeditionary Air Squadron (EAS) has brought the Eagle Vision, a ground-based satellite imagery system, to Clark Air Base in Pampanga, Philippines together with a collection manager from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii and geospatial and imagery anaylsts from Ft. Shafter, Hawaii.

The deployment was done to conduct a two-week long US PACAF Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) mission together with Philippine Air Force (PAF) members. The SMEEs will focus on using geospatial satellite imagery, acquired by Eagle Vision, to support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief efforts.

“Eagle Vision can move all over the world, we can set up our system anywhere and start pulling down imagery from commercial satellites,” said Chief Master Sgt. Reid Tsubota, Eagle Vision Superintendent with the Hawaii Air National Guard’s 154th Wing from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.

“The HADR applications of this system are incredible. In fact, this is our fourth time here in the Philippines. In 2006 we were initially supporting exercise Balikatan when the Southern Leyte mudslides occurred here. Using Eagle Vision we were able to to provide the Marine Corps’ first responders imagery that ultimately helped in the recovery and relief efforts,” Tsubota said.

http://www.update.ph/2017/01/us-brings-satellite-imagery-system-eagle-vision-to-philippines/13434

AFP adopts new security plan in NIR

From the Visayan Daily Star (Jan 21): AFP adopts new security plan in NIR

The Army's 3rd Infantry Division is now implementing the new campaign plan of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, dubbed as Development Support and Security Plan Kapayaan, in the Negros Island Region, Western and Central Visayas.

Newly-promoted Maj. Gen. Jon Aying, 3ID commander, yesterday said that the new campaign plan, which started this year until 2022, is a sequel to the AFP previous campaign plan, which ended December last year.

Aying, who joined the assessment of the Comprehensive Local Integration Program of the Department of Interior and Local Government yesterday, which was participated in by 50 former rebels at the provincial Capitol in Bacolod City, said the concept and approach in the Bayanihan campaign plan will be continued.

But he said some weak points in the previous campaign plan, which is not progressive towards achieving genuine and lasting peace, or development, had already been corrected.

The new campaign plan highlights and enhances the new and renewed role of the AFP towards nation building, especially in relation to the direction set by President Rodrigo Duterte.

Col. Edgard Arevalo, AFP Public Affairs Office chief, said the plan will serve as the blueprint as to how the AFP shall conduct its campaigns.

Arevalo said that the plan implemented during most of the administration of then President Benigno Aquino III was a success, stressing that it was able to achieve the objective, including the whole of nation approach.

As a result of it, the provinces of Negros Occidental and Oriental, Iloilo and Capiz have been declared as peaceful and ready for further development, while the island provinces of Guimaras and Siquijor, as well as Antique and Aklan, have been declared as insurgency-free, which are all under the area of operations of 3ID.

The new campaign plan also sets the direction for the military to support police operations against illegal drugs, among others.

http://www.visayandailystar.com/2017/January/21/negor2.htm

PH, NDF activate monitoring body amid ceasefire complaints

From Rappler (Jan 22): PH, NDF activate monitoring body amid ceasefire complaints

Hopes are up for a bilateral ceasefire deal that will prevent misencounters on the ground   

GUIDELINES. Negotiators of the government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines sign supplemental guidelines for the Joint Monitoring Committee. Photo from OPAPP

GUIDELINES. Negotiators of the government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines sign supplemental guidelines for the Joint Monitoring Committee. Photo from OPAPP

The languishing Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), the body tasked to monitor and investigate human rights abuses of security forces and communist rebels, was given a new lease on life amid a threat that the ongoing ceasefire will collapse.

Negotiators of the government and the communist National Democratic Front (NDF) on Saturday, January 21, signed supplemental guidelines that will make the JMC fully operational.

It is hailed as the first major achievement of the 3rd round of talks held Rome, Italy following a threat that the New People's Army (NPA) wants to withdraw the 5-month-old declaration of unilateral and indefinite ceasefire because of the delayed release of political prisoners and alleged ceasefire abuses by the military. (READ: No ceasefire expected soon as NDF extend timeline of talks)

Key to the activation of monitoring body is a funding from Norway, the 3rd country facilitating the talks to end Asia's longest-running communist insurgency.

Hopes up for a bilateral ceasefire deal

Government chief negotiator Silvestre Bello III is hoping that the activation of the JMC will bode well for the possible elevation of the current unilateral ceasefires – separately declared by the military and the NPA – into a bilateral ceasefire deal that will put in place common rules on the ground.

A bilateral ceasefire deal is critical in making sure misencounters on the ground – which could hurt ongoing talks – are avoided.

“This should be taken as an incentive for us to work harder in the remaining days of this round of talks, especially on our efforts to put in place a joint ceasefire agreement – a peace dividend that our people have been waiting for,” Bello said.

NDF chief negotiators Fidel Agcaoili is counting on the JMC to investigate alleged human rights violations of state forces, pointing out the arrests of suspected communist rebels based on allegedly trumped up charges. Rights group Karapatan claimed reporting more than 4,000 violations since 2004.

"The first big test of the seriousness of the GRP in these negotiations is compliance with CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law). For if the GRP cannot fulfill its obligations in an agreement already signed, what is our guarantee with regard to future agreements?," Agcaoili said.

The military also accused the NPA of ceasefire abuses such as the burning of buses and alleged extortion on business owners. The Department of National Defense had submitted to the government panel its inputs to the proposed bilateral ceasefire agreement.

First substantive agenda

The JMC was created after the government and the NDF signed in 1998 the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), the 1st of the 4 substantive agenda to be negotiated before a peace deal is finalized. (READ: NDF not ready to sign final peace deal before 2020)

CARHRIHL encourages victims of human rights violations and abuses by security forces and the NPA to file complaints in order to receive indemnification.

"Persons liable for violations and abuses of human rights shall be subject to investigation and, if evidence warrants, to prosecution and trial. The victims or their survivors shall be indemnified. All necessary measures shall be undertaken to remove the conditions for violations and abuses of human rights and to render justice to and indemnify the victims," reads the CARHRIHL.

Bello said new laws on human rights (HR) and international humanitarian law (IHL) will aid the full operation of the JMC, citing the law against enforced disappearance, Anti-Torture Act, IHL Act, Human Security Act, Writ of Amparo, and the Writ of Kalikasan, among others.

The 3 other agenda are the follow: Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER), Comprehensive Agreement on Political Reforms (CAPR), and Comprehensive Agreement on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces (CAEHDF).

http://www.rappler.com/nation/159122-joint-monitoring-committee-ceasefire-complaints

Feature: After almost 17 years after all-out-war, GPH and MILF panel chairs set foot again in Camp Abubakar

From the Philippine Information Agency (Jan 22): Feature: After almost 17 years after all-out-war, GPH and MILF panel chairs set foot again in Camp Abubakar

It was a historic coincidence indeed as World Bank representative Matthew Stephens noted that, in the 11 year-operation of the Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF), it is only here that both heads of the peace panels of the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) came together to grace the turnover of MTF projects.

“This is very symbolic that, after almost 17 years after the all-out-war, both panels came together here to show their support for peace and their commitment for development,” Stephens said during the turnover of a Php2.35 million Level II Water System; 120 cattle-dispersal livelihood project for women; and the completion ceremony of 70 basic literacy learners of the Alternative Learning System (ALS) under MTF’s camps transformation program on Tuesday, January 17, in Camp Abubakar, Brgy. Tugaig, Barira, Maguindanao.

Government Implementing Panel for the Bangsamoro Peace Accords Chairperson Irene Santiago also reminisced that it was almost 17 years ago when she first set foot in Camp Abubakar, along with eight (8) other women peace advocates to meet the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim and try to persuade the MILF, as well as the Estrada government, to prevent the bloody all-out-war in 2000 from happening.

“I think April yun, of course maalala niyo kasi kayo yung naapektuhan ng mas malaki (I think it was April, of course you will remember, because you were the most affected here),” Santiago said.

“It was different then. We passed roads with big rocks. It was not yet cemented,” she recalled.

In 2001 up to 2004 Santiago became a member of the peace panel negotiating with the MILF.

“I am not new with your struggle, I have been with you since 1977,” Santiago said as she expressed her joy seeing many women graduating from the ALS as she has been organizing Muslim women and serving Muslim communities all over Mindanao since 1977.

Incidentally, it is also the first time for MILF Implementing Panel Chair Mohagher Iqbal to set foot again in Camp Abubakar since the 2000 all-out-war.

“Ito ang unang pagpunta ko dito (this is my first time to come here) for almost 17 years. The last time was on 24 April 2000 when we had a briefing with the late Chairman Salamat Hashim,” Iqbal recalls.

Normalization is having equal opportunities to dream high

The government implementing panel chair further emphasized the need to transform former MILF camps into normal, productive communities.

“I have just asked a graduate here on what she wants to be and she answered me she wants to be a teacher, but when I asked again if she wanted to become a lawyer she answered me ‘yes,’” Santiago shares her conversation with one of the women ALS graduates.

“That is the reason why we came here for: to give you equal opportunities to dream as high as the others. That is what we mean by normal—to dream what you really want to reach and not to think that it is hard because you are living in Moro communities.”

She urged the community to never lose hope—saying that if there is hope, there will be peace.
Iqbal, for his part, calls on the community to “take ownership” and treasure the projects because development needs the intervention from people themselves citing verses form the Holy Qur’an:

“Allah (SWT) does not change the conditions of the people unless they change what is in their hearts”and that “Man shall have nothing than what he strives for.”

“The government has been helping so much—we cannot deny that—but it cannot be complete if we do not help ourselves,” he added.

As part of the confidence-building measures enumerated in the Annex on Normalization of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), the Government and MILF agreed to undertake necessary measures for the transformation of the six previously acknowledged MILF camps, namely: Camps Abubakar-as-Siddique, Omar, Rajamuda, Badre, Bushra, and Bilal. The Joint Task Forces on Camps Transformation, with representatives from both GPH and MILF, coordinate and facilitate development programs for the said camps.

The Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) is a multi-donor grant facility established in 2005 to consolidate international development assistance for the socio-economic recovery of conflict-affected communities in Mindanao, Philippines. It funds programs and projects that promote economic opportunity, provide access to basic services, and build social cohesion to help create stable and secure communities. The Facility is administered by the World Bank.

http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1141484970689/feature-after-almost-17-years-after-all-out-war-gph-and-milf-panel-chairs-set-foot-again-in-camp-abubakar

PH, Chinese officials meet for the 20th Foreign Ministry consultations

From the Philippine Information Agency (Jan 22): PH, Chinese officials meet for the 20th Foreign Ministry consultations

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Undersecretary Enrique A. Manalo led the Philippine delegation at the 20th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations (FMC) in Manila, Philippines on January 18. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Vice Minister Liu Zhenmin led the Chinese delegation.

The Philippines and China discussed a wide range of areas for cooperation, including law enforcement, trade and investment, finance, tourism, culture, people-to-people exchanges, among others.

The Philippines highlighted that it would continue to enhance functional cooperation with China guided by the Philippine Development Plan and President Duterte’s 10-Point Socioeconomic Agenda.

Both sides also exchanged views on strengthening cooperation under the ASEAN framework, as China reiterated its support for the Philippines’ ASEAN Chairmanship in 2017.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea, guided by the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Both sides spoke on the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) and the mutual interest to reach a COC Framework by the middle of 2017. The Philippines also conveyed its concerns on recent incidents in the South China Sea.

Finally, both sides agreed to establish a bilateral consultation mechanism on the South China Sea, which will discuss current and other issues of concern to either side, as stated in the Joint Statement issued on the occasion of President Duterte’s State Visit to China in October 2016.

“The Philippines and China should work together and cooperate for peace and stability in the region, and build mutual trust and confidence,” said Undersecretary Manalo.

The last FMC was held in Beijing in 2013. Both sides agreed to hold the 21st FMC at a mutually agreed date in 2018, with China as the host. (DFA)

http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1141484978843/ph-chinese-officials-meet-for-the-20th-foreign-ministry-consultations

(Update) GRP, NDFP panels sign supplemental guidelines for full operation of the Joint Monitoring Committee

From the Philippine News Agency (Jan 21): (Update) GRP, NDFP panels sign supplemental guidelines for full operation of the Joint Monitoring Committee



The Government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) signed on Saturday the supplemental guidelines for the full operation of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) under the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) during the 3rd round-of-talks in Rome, Italy.

The signing of the supplemental guidelines by GROP panel Chair Silvestre Bello III and NDF Chair Fidel Agcaoili, is a significant move under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte after the first draft crafted in 2004 was not signed when the peace negotiations bogged down in 2011.

The supplemental guidelines is a set of mechanisms on how to address complaints of violation by the government forces and the armed wing of the NDF – the New People’s Army (NPA). The supplemental guidelines are issued pursuant to the Operational Guidelines for the JMC issued on 14 February 2004, in Oslo, Norway by the GRP and NDFP peace negotiators.

Bello said the signing of the supplemental guidelines is not only an affirmation to International Human Rights Law of the Duterte administration but also a concrete dividend of the third round-of-talks. Bello said this also bodes well to the possible signing of the bilateral ceasefire set to benefit more the people living in conflict-affected areas.

“This should be taken as an incentive for us to work harder in the remaining days of this round of talks, especially on our efforts to put in place a joint ceasefire agreement – a peace dividend that our people have been waiting for,” he said in his statement.

Bello said the adoption of the guidelines is a realization of CARHRIHL, which is one of the four substantive agenda of the negotiations that will comprise the final peace agreement. The other three remaining substantive agenda are socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and end of hostilities and disposition of forces.

According to Bello, the full operation of the JMC with its supplemental guidelines in place, should not be difficult under the government’s legal regime that includes new and bold laws and statutes upholding human rights and international humanitarian laws, such as the law against enforced disappearance, anti-torture act, IHL Act, Human Security Act, Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Kalikasan, among others.

The NDF chair welcomed the signing and thanked the GRP panel as this would advance the ongoing peace negotiations.

Agcaoili said the supplemental guidelines will govern operations of the JMC and the Joint Secretariat.

The supplemental guidelines include provisions on how to file and deal with complaints and details the roles of the receivers of the complaints, the joint secretariat and third party facilitator.

Under the guidelines, complaints for alleged violations of the specific provisions of the CARHRIHL may be filed either in person, through email, website, fax, post or courier to the Nominated Section in the Joint Secretariat, who shall immediately forward the same to the Co-Chairpersons of the JMC for proper disposition.

A complainant could be the victim of the alleged violation of the CARHRIHL, a relative of the victim, a duly-authorized representative, or any person, organization or entity with direct, substantial or sufficient interest in the subject of the complaint such as human rights groups, peace advocacy groups, church members, media or anyone capable of filing the complaint on behalf of the victim or relative of the victim.

The Co-Chairpersons of the respective Monitoring Committees will undertake an inquiry of initial facts for purposes of determining its sufficiency as a complaint that may warrant further action or investigation. The filing, pendency, dismissal, termination or withdrawal of a complaint or other communication before other fora shall not preclude the filing of a similar complaint before the JMC. The complainants will be also be notified of the status and action on their complaints.

The complaints, evidence and supporting documents shall be subject to review and evaluation by the respective Nominated Sections to determine whether the alleged violations are within the coverage of the CARHRIHL and the complaints are valid in form and contain sufficient data or information to allow further investigation either separately or jointly by the respective Monitoring Committees.

If the complaint and other pieces of evidence warrant further investigation, the JMC, by consensus, may decide to conduct a joint fact-finding of a complaint, issue or specific incident with the possible participation of independent international observers.

Incidents or issues of urgent import or significance arising from a complaint, or from submitted documents and information not yet the subject of a complaint, may be brought to the attention of the Co-Chairperson of the concerned Party for corresponding action or immediate response.

The supplemental guidelines also underscore protection for the victims, witnesses and complainants as their safety and security are the primordial consideration in the handling and treatment of cases.

“These Supplemental Guidelines affirm the principles of truth, justice, equity, transparency and accountability in addressing the issues of violations of human rights; and international humanitarian law,” the guideline states.

The identity and other relevant information of victims, witnesses and complainants especially children and minors, will be kept confidential upon their request or whenever necessary to secure their protection.

Meanwhile, the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) would serve as third Party Facilitator providing advice, opinions and suggestions to the two Monitoring Committees of the JMC, to receive updates on the progress of the work from the JMC, to extend assistance to facilitate the work of the JMC and its Joint Secretariat, to provide support for the work of the JMC and the general implementation of the CARHRIHL.

The members of the GRP monitoring committee composed of Atty. Efren Moncupa, Usec Antonio Kho, Col Facundo Palafox and Hernani Braganza as Panel supervisor while for the NDFP side were Coni Ledesma and Concha Araneta, and Benito Tiamzon as supervising Panel member also signed the supplemental guidelines as witnesses.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=2&sid=&nid=2&rid=957186

President Duterte wants update on raps in relation to Mamasapano incident -- Aguirre

From the Philippine News Agency (Jan 21): President Duterte wants update on raps in relation to Mamasapano incident -- Aguirre

President Rodrigo Duterte ordered the Department of Justice (DOJ) to give an update on the status of the case in connection to the January 2015 Mamasapano clash that killed more than 60 persons, including 44 members of the elite Philippine National Police-Special Action Force (PNP-SAF), Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II said.

”Wala naman siyang (President Duterte) sinasabing for or against, basta nabanggit lamang niya na bubuksan yung Mamasapano at i-update namin yung Presidential Communications Office on the latest current status ng Mamasapano,” Aguirre told reporters in an interview.

The case is for the complex crime of direct assault with murder against 88 members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and private armed groups (PAGs) in connection to the Jan. 25 Mamasapano incident which led to the deaths of 44 members of the SAF along with international terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir, a.k.a. Marwan.

Charged for direct assault with murder are five Commanders Abdulrahman Abdulrakman Upan, Rakman (118TH MILF), Refy Guiaman, Anife and Haumves alias Haves, operation commander of the 105th MILF Base Command and 83 others.

Aguirre said the current status of the case last December the Cotabato local court orders to submit additional evidence consisting of the birth certificates of some of the accused.

”Hindi mapro-prove yung identity ng akusado kasi almost to 100. So sinubmit na yan ng prosecution. Up to now, siguro mga one month ago, Dec. 18, hindi pa nagbababa ang court sa Cotabato kung merong probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest,” Aguirre explained.

He also directed its prosecutors to move for the transfer of the trial of the case to Manila.

”Ipinagfa-file ko na early January na magfile na for transfer of venue para dito sa Manila,” he noted.
On Jan. 25, 2015, the slain police commandos were deployed to Mamasapano to capture wanted terrorists Marwan and Abdul Basit Usman.

Marwan, a Malaysian bomb maker with a bounty from the US government, was killed during the operations.

The operation resulted in the death of Marwan but also sparked a fierce encounter that claimed the lives of SAF members.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=1&sid=&nid=1&rid=957188

After almost 17 years of war, GPH and MILF panel chairs set foot again in Camp Abubakar

From the Philippine News Agency (Jan 21): After almost 17 years of war, GPH and MILF panel chairs set foot again in Camp Abubakar

It was a historic coincidence, as World Bank representative Matthew Stephens noted, that in the 11-year operation of the Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF), it was only in Barira, Maguindanao that both heads of the peace panels of the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) came together to grace the turnover of MTF projects, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) said in a release issued Saturday.

“This is very symbolic that, after almost 17 years after the all-out war, both panels came together here to show their support for peace and their commitment for development,” Stephens said last Jan. 17 during the turnover of a PHP2.35 million Level II Water System; 120 cattle-dispersal livelihood project for women; and the completion ceremony of 70 basic literacy learners of the Alternative Learning System (ALS) under the MTF’s camps transformation program in Camp Abubakar, Brgy. Tugaig in Barira, Maguindanao.

Government Implementing Panel for the Bangsamoro Peace Accords chairperson Irene Santiago also reminisced that it was almost 17 years ago when she first set foot in Camp Abubakar, along with eight other women peace advocates to meet the late MILF chairman Salamat Hashim and try to persuade the MILF, as well as the Estrada government, to prevent the bloody all-out war in 2000 from happening.

“I think April yun, of course, maalala niyo kasi kayo yung naapektuhan ng mas malaki (I think it was April, of course, you will remember because you were the most affected here),” Santiago said.
“It was different then. We passed roads with big rocks. It was not yet cemented.”

In 2001 up to 2004, Santiago became a member of the peace panel negotiating with the MILF.
“I am not new with your struggle, I have been with you since 1977,” Santiago said as she expressed her joy upon seeing many women graduating from the ALS as she has been organizing Muslim women and serving Muslim communities all over Mindanao since 1977.

Incidentally, it is also the first time for MILF Implementing Panel chair Mohagher Iqbal to set foot again in Camp Abubakar since the 2000 war.

“Ito ang unang pagpunta ko dito (This is my first time to come here) for almost 17 years. The last time was on 24 April 2000 when we had a briefing with the late chairman Salamat Hashim,” Iqbal recalled.

The government implementing panel chair further emphasized the need to transform former MILF camps into normal, productive communities.

“I have just asked a graduate here on what she wants to be and she answered me she wants to be a teacher, but when I asked again if she wanted to become a lawyer she answered me ‘yes’,” Santiago said, sharing her conversation with one of the women ALS graduates.

“That is the reason why we came here: to give you equal opportunities to dream as high as the others. That is what we mean by normal -- to dream what you really want to reach and not to think that it is hard because you are living in Moro communities.”

She urged the community never to lose hope, saying that if there is hope, there will be peace.
Iqbal, for his part, called on the community to “take ownership” and treasure the projects because development needs intervention from the people themselves, citing verses form the Holy Qur’an:
“Allah (SWT) does not change the conditions of the people unless they change what is in their hearts... Man shall have nothing than what he strives for.”

“The government has been helping so much, we cannot deny that, but it cannot be complete if we do not help ourselves,” he said.

As part of the confidence-building measures enumerated in the Annex on Normalization of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), the government and MILF agreed to undertake necessary measures for the transformation of the six previously acknowledged MILF camps, namely: Camps Abubakar-as-Siddique, Omar, Rajamuda, Badre, Bushra, and Bilal.

The Joint Task Forces on Camps Transformation, with representatives from both the GPH and MILF, coordinate and facilitate development programs for these camps.

The MTF is a multi-donor grant facility established in 2005 to consolidate international development assistance for the socio-economic recovery of conflict-affected communities in Mindanao.

It funds programs and projects that promote economic opportunity, provide access to basic services, and build social cohesion to help create stable and secure communities. The facility is administered by the World Bank.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=1&sid=&nid=1&rid=957041

Spare parts for hydraulic systems of 3 PAF attack AW-109s needed

From the Philippine News Agency (Jan 20): Spare parts for hydraulic systems of 3 PAF attack AW-109s needed

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is allocating PHP10.79 million for the acquisition of spare parts needed for the maintenance of the hydraulic systems of its three AgustaWestland AW-109 attack helicopters.

These spare parts are for AW-109 attack helicopters with tail numbers 821, 822, and 823.

The Philippine Air Force (PAF) currently has eight AW-109 attack helicopters in its fleet supporting the older MG-520 attack choppers. Pre-bid conference is on Jan. 26 at the PAF Procurement Center Conference Room, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City.

Bid opening is at 9 a.m. at the same venue on Feb. 8, PAF Bids and Awards Committee chair, Brig. Gen. Nicolas Parilla said.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=1&sid=&nid=1&rid=957055

Sec. Lorenzana nakipagpulong sa mga sundalo na nasa Sibutu Island

From DWDD AFP Civil Relations Service Radio Website (Jan 20): Sec. Lorenzana nakipagpulong sa mga sundalo na nasa Sibutu Island

sibutu

Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City — Pumunta si Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana at ilan pang matataas na opisyal ng Armed Forces of the Philippines sa Sibutu Island upang bisitahin ang mga tropa na naroon at para na rin maipakita ang suporta sa kampanya ng pamahalaan laban sa terorismo, kidnapping, piracy at iligal na droga.

Kasama sina AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo  Ano, Army Chief Lt. Gen. Glorioso Miranda, Navy chief Vice Amiral Ronald Joseph Mercado, Air Force Chief Lt. General edgar Fallorina at labing isa pang mga heneral at flag officers.

Pinangunahan ni Lorenzana ang pagpupulong kasama ang municipal at baranggay officials kasama si Sibutu Mayor Alshefa Pajiji at mga military commanders sa Tawi-tawi.

Binigyang-diin niLorenzana ang kahalagahan  ng pakikipag-kooperasyon ng mga local leaders para sa ikabubuti ng bansa.

Siniguro pa niya ang kanyang masugid na pag-suporta para makatulong sa pagsugpo ng kriminal na gawain ng Abu Sayyaf  at iba pang problema sa bansa.

Malaking pasasalamat naman ang inihatid ni Mayor Pajiji sa kalihim dahil umano sa pag reach out nito sa kanila. -EPJA

http://dwdd.com.ph/2017/01/20/sec-lorenzana-nakipagpulong-sa-mga-sundalo-na-nasa-sibutu-islan/

DWDD: STATEMENT || Defense Sec. Lorenzana: AFP intensifies intelligence and operations in the Asia-Pacific

From DWDD AFP Civil Relations Service Radio Website (Jan 20): STATEMENT || Defense Sec. Lorenzana: AFP intensifies intelligence and operations in the Asia-Pacific  

snd-delfin-lorenzana

Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana explained that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has long-standing instructions to intensify its intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism operations in the Asia-Pacific.

Lorenzana assured everyone that security forces are constantly monitoring possible terror threats to the country.

The statement was released after the recent comment of Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the US Pacific Command, on the possibility of more attacks in the Asia-Pacific.

With threats crossing borders, Lorenzana also added with their counterparts in the ASEAN to monitor and address such threats. This is the reason behind why as early as July last year, they have already signed a Trilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Malaysia and Indonesia to strengthen joint efforts in fighting terrorism, piracy, and other crimes.

 The said agreement reaffirms the continuous efforts in enhancing existing cooperation among the three countries through the enhancement of mutual cooperation and collaboration among militaries of the three countries.

Furthermore, Lorenzana said that they intensified the operations in the Southern Philippines by strengthening naval and air assets.

Lastly, he mentioned the instituted changes in the AFP leadership, in which placed people with extensive experience in Central and Western Mindanao Areas. – EPJA

http://dwdd.com.ph/2017/01/20/statement-defense-sec-lorenzana-afp-intensifies-intelligence-and-operations-in-the-asia-pacific/